The recent resurgence of the Greek-Turkish dispute raises the reasonable question: How can this dispute be addressed more effectively, with the aim of returning to the recession of the period 1999-2011, which was beneficial to both countries? And how can the confrontational conflict be avoided and de-escalation be achieved?

This book, in the form of questions and answers, aims to better understand the problems arising in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean (with reference to Cyprus), with the ultimate goal of peacefully resolving the Greek-Turkish differences in both seas. The basic prerequisite is a more objective knowledge and not perceptions and decision-making based on ethnocentric stereotypes and fear of political cost.
The key for Greek diplomacy is to make a clear distinction between (a) extreme Turkish actions, such as the Memorandum with Libya, drilling in the Eastern Aegean, and the wave of refugees at the Evros River and the islands, and (b) Turkey's serious positions (which are more numerous) on Aegean, Eastern Mediterranean, and Cyprus issues, which constitute its legitimate and vital interests.

In the book, it will become apparent that all Greek-Turkish differences in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, in combination with the Cyprus issue, are susceptible to mutually beneficial solutions, without excessive sacrifices and unbearable compromises. It will also become apparent that Turkey's current provocative statements and actions are not due, as most Greeks believe, to Turkish expansionism and revisionism of borders at the expense of Greece or Cyprus, but to other reasons, primarily the "encirclement syndrome" and the "Sevres syndrome". As for the Aegean Sea, Turkey's reaction is due to its belief that Greece wants to turn it into a "Greek lake", and in the Eastern Mediterranean, it believes that Greece seeks the lion's share and the restriction of Turkey to its coasts only.