Greece did not accidentally reach the brink of bankruptcy. A long journey of catastrophic political-economic choices led the country towards the abyss. This book precisely traces this dead-end path of three decades.

The dead-ends have their roots in the "fateful four-year period" of 1981-1985, when specific policies of statism and populism dramatically expanded the public sector, formed an economic model on shaky ground, and opened a vicious cycle of uncontrollable deficits and debts.

From then on, the tragedy was that all political leaderships, while recognizing the problem, did little to address it. And this despite the overwhelming majority of public opinion persistently demanding a reduction in the public sector. However, the impasse was maintained by clientelistic party mechanisms, vested interests, statist trade unions, and timid leaderships. Political leaders who were bearers of hopes disappointed them.

As the government now drags its feet on reforms and the opposition displays irresponsibility and populism, what prospects are there for the country's salvation from a party system that led it to the abyss?