The issue of public debt has been and remains the cornerstone of the Greek adventure. The inability to service it led the country to the first memorandum, and the need to smooth the cost of servicing it led lenders to one of the largest debt restructurings in recent history.

The process of revising the terms of servicing and restructuring public debt is ongoing. Regardless of their differences, all estimates converge on their basic scenario in a horizon of perpetuating the problem, while in case of economic developments for the worse in an "explosive" expansion of it.

If we also take into account the reversal of quantitative easing policies by central banks, the announced cancellation of bond purchase programs by eurozone member states by the European Central Bank, the evolving revaluation of bond market risk, and the medium and long-term estimates of anaemic economic growth for most developed economies, then the issue of public debt still retains its character as a cornerstone for future developments and requires a substantive assessment of the policies that have been implemented - not only for historical reasons.

Proposals for Greek debt are being made public and evaluated in view of the completion of the third program and the exit to the "markets". It should be noted that after a period of eight or more years of crisis and while several interventions have been made in debt management, there is no mechanism for the nominal reduction of the debt of eurozone member states. In this context, it was necessary to "baptize" Greek debt as sustainable in order to bypass the provisions of the ESM and the IMF. The result of these deficiencies is the inability to provide definitive solutions for Greek debt, as the measures taken corresponded more to measures to address liquidity crises than to measures to address debt crises.

The current structure of Greek debt makes it vulnerable to speculative attacks and therefore turns it into a destabilizing factor. Moreover, the long-term maintenance of high debt in a currency not controlled by the domestic central bank contains an inherent destabilizing element, which reinforces crises and fuels speculative attacks. As is evident from the assessment of interventions in the net present value of debt, the limits of financial engineering have been exhausted. If there is no reduction in the nominal value of Greek debt, given its trajectory, then the solution to the debt issue is shifted to the twenty-second century.